Implied share loss

By Larry Gross

The Trump administration seems to be heading toward a future in which different nations will have different tariff levels. If achieved and maintained, in the long run, countries with lower tariff levels will become the main origins for imported products.

This trend is already underway regarding imports from China. It seems reasonable to assume— given the escalating trade and political tensions between China and the US— that most, if not all, importers of Chinese goods are scrambling to find alternative sources.

These changes will have differing impacts depending on which US coast is involved, and an analysis of S & P Global PIERS data gives some idea of the impact of the China freezeout. More than 41 % of the containerized imports that arrived in the US last year originated in mainland China. Therefore, a dramatic slowdown in these volumes is very significant.

Meanwhile, shipments from other origins, particularly other Asian nations, are surging, given the 90-day reprieve granted by President Donald Trump. Importers will try to crowd as much of this freight through the keyhole as they can. Around 32 % of US import TEUs came from other Asian nations, including India, in 2024. The surge in traffic from these origins will help cushion the blow from the China slowdown, but only to a limited degree.

The US West Coast will feel these changes more acutely than the East or Gulf coasts. More than 57 % of the loaded TEUs that landed on the US West Coast in 2024 came from China, while shipments from China comprised“ only” 25 % of the East Coast’ s volume, with the Gulf Coast in between at 35 %.

There is another way to look at the situation, which is to divvy up the US import volume originating in each global region by coast of arrival. This can help us gauge the potential impact of such shifts in origin.

However, it’ s important to keep in mind that US West Coast share was artificially boosted by cargo diversions away from the East Coast due to labor unrest for much of last year. Therefore, some share loss will be inevitable even without changes in origin shipping points.

In 2024, unsurprisingly, the US West Coast was the dominant recipient of Chinaoriginating cargo, accounting for 65 % of those TEUs, followed by the East Coast( 27 %) and the Gulf Coast( 8 %). It is reasonable to expect that some of the China volume will move to new originations in Southeast Asia. US West Coast share of Southeast Asia originations was 55 % in 2024, 10 points lower than China.

In other words, for every 100 TEUs of China-originating freight that migrates to, say, Vietnam, the US West Coast loses 10 inbound TEUs, the Gulf Coast loses 6 TEUs, and the East Coast gains 16 TEUs.

The situation becomes even more extreme if the origin migrates to India. The US East Coast received 86 % of laden TEUs originating from the Indian subcontinent last year.

Because the US West Coast share is higher for China-originating freight than any other region, even including other Northeast Asian nations— i. e., Japan, Taiwan and South Korea— literally any move away from China can be expected to negatively affect the US West Coast’ s share of inbound cargo.

This means ports on the US West Coast may be facing a triple-barreled threat: 1. Lower overall volumes due to the trade war; 2. Loss of share as imports that were diverted in 2024 due to both the East Coast labor uncertainty and the Red Sea / Suez Canal closure return to their previous East and Gulf coast routings; and

3. Additional loss of share due to migration of imports away from China toward other origin regions that are less favorable to the US West Coast. In other words, when it comes to US ports, the trade war will result in winners and losers. Or perhaps more accurately, bigger losers and smaller losers.

email: lgross @ intermodalindepth. com

Non-China Asian nations supply one-third of US imports

Percentage of containerized US imports in 2024 by origin

Source: PIERS; S & P Global

Any move away from China can be expected to negatively affect the US West Coast’ s share of inbound cargo.

41.3 % China 14.3 % Other Northeast Asia 13.6 % Europe / Mediterranean 13.6 % Southeast Asia 10.6 % South / Central America / Carribean 4.2 % India 2.5 % Other

July 7, 2025 | Page 21

Implied share loss