Container Shipping Quarterly

Special Report

COMMENTARY

By Lars Jensen

The days when container vessels could be seen as fungible assets might be coming to an end.

For stakeholders in the container shipping supply chain, the past six months have brought a flurry of rapid changes in relation to US tariff policy. It’ s easy to be caught up in the turmoil that this has caused, including rapid demand and supply swings as well as likely the sharpest and shortest spike in spot rates ever seen on the trans-Pacific.

It’ s also clear that this kind of turmoil will continue as the US focuses on implementing possible tariffs on furniture, which makes up some 7 % of total US imports by container volume. An unresolved tariff situation with China and a significant lack of detail around the trade deals already announced only add to the volatility.

However, there is a potentially more important change beginning to happen that is more global in nature and goes beyond tariffs, one that, to some degree, will challenge the fundamental workings of how shipping networks usually operate.

For the most part, the vessels themselves are fungible assets. If I have a vessel with a capacity of 5,000 TEUs, for example, I can essentially use this vessel anywhere globally, moving any type of cargo that can fit in a container on behalf of any shipper and changing the flag to almost any nation of my choosing. And if I have no need for the vessel, I can sell or charter it to anyone who, in turn, will have the same high degree of flexibility regarding the usage of the vessel.

This makes the fleet of container vessels extremely versatile and allows a highly efficient cascading process whereby, for the most part, vessels are moved to the trades where they are most optimally used. Balancing capacity not only with demand but also the capability of port infrastructure allows for a high degree of asset utilization, and consequently, lower costs for shippers.

New obstacles

It is this efficiency that is coming under pressure. Consider the developments we have seen here in 2025:

The US is placing penalties on vessels built, owned or operated in China. This is already causing network changes as carriers will either shift some port calls and / or phase in vessels from other trades. This would mean suboptimal usage of vessels and ports in order to reduce this externally imposed cost.

India prohibited the call of vessels coming from Pakistan, resulting in a sharp reduction of direct services from Pakistan to the rest of the world. Instead, more feeder services were established— clearly suboptimal vessel usage compared with having large vessels call both nations on major deep-sea services.

Turkey is prohibiting Israeli-affiliated vessels from calling Turkish ports and is also prohibiting Turkish-flagged vessels from calling Israel.

The conflict between Thailand and Cambodia resulted in the closure of the land border, effectively preventing vessels calling the major port in Laem Chabang from efficiently servicing Cambodian imports and exports.

Twenty-five container vessels were placed on the US OFAC sanctions list as they were seen as affiliated with Iranian logistics operations, effectively removing approximately one-third of SeaLead Shipping’ s fleet from one day to the next.

These are just a few examples from 2025. We have, of course, seen various restrictions in the past, but the speed and scale with which this is ramping up is new.

Later in 2025, we will likely see the results of the US Federal Maritime Commission’ s investigation into unfair flag-state competition. There are no prizes for guessing that, yes, of course there is a skewed competitive landscape— that is why flags of convenience have been popular for centuries. The only relevant question is what type of additional regulations and restrictions the US will impose based on nationality.

Then comes the debacle concerning the carbon tax on marine fossil fuels, which will likely be adopted at the October meeting of the International Maritime Organization’ s Marine Environment Protection Committee. It is crystal clear that the US will not participate. The open question is how many other countries will side with the US, creating more loopholes based on nationality.

All in all, the days when container vessels to a significant degree could be seen as fungible assets might be coming to an end. Not that all flexibility will be lost. However, it is rapidly being reduced, which leads to inefficiencies in the global container liner networks. And inefficiencies equal greater costs.

email: lars. jensen @ vespucci-maritime. com

24 Journal of Commerce | October 6, 2025 www. joc. com