One foot on land

By Jeremy Masters

The relentless drive of the biggest ocean carriers to increase fleet sizes comes with an equally strong push to vertically integrate. Carriers and their affiliates now own approximately 50 % of worldwide terminal capacity, close to double what it was 10 years ago, according to various industry estimates.

There is obviously a good business case for buying assets that will reduce costs, increase efficiency, or strengthen a separate profit center. Being flush with cash makes the decision relatively easy.

History in this industry and others tells us, however, there are phases of accelerated vertical integration when things are good, followed by restructuring and selling of“ non-core” assets. Are there characteristics of liner shipping, such as terminals increasingly being considered core assets, that make this more or less likely in the long term? And what is good for the industry?

There is a close correlation between the size of the carrier and the size of their terminal portfolio; Mediterranean Shipping Co.( MSC), Maersk, CMA CGM, Hapag-Lloyd, and Cosco Shipping are the big beasts on both sides. This is natural because of financial clout, but also because these carriers control more services— both via consortium and independently— and thus have more direct influence over choice of terminal. Even within this group, however, all is not equal.

The move to becoming an independent worldwide carrier able to make the great majority of its ship deployment and terminal choices on its own makes MSC the most obvious carrier to buy terminals, safe in the knowledge that they can drive volume through them. Assuming MSC pushes onward to control up to 30 % of worldwide slot capacity and continues to be a financial powerhouse, there is nothing to stop it from moving forward with similar percentages of terminal capacity. The Hutchison Port Holdings transaction, if completed, will significantly accelerate this.

Other mega-carriers cannot entirely divorce their terminal portfolios from their consortium relationships, which need to be complimentary to a degree to make the best use of assets. This leads to questions over whether these consortiums are all set in stone.

Maersk has been a long-term player in the terminal sector through APM and, of course, controlling key hubs is a crucial part of the Gemini schedule reliability drive. The jury is still out, however, on whether integrated logistics has been a successful diversion for Maersk, and there are potentially starkly different directions its future business model could take.

This, in turn, will affect its relationship with Hapag-Lloyd and what each does within and outside their relationship. Hapag-Lloyd is still a comparatively minor player in terminal ownership, so Hanseatic Global Terminals may be considered a tradeable chip at some point.

The Ocean Alliance is the largest, most stable consortium to date and has the longest to run. This means there is a lot of captive business from the members, and CMA CGM and Cosco can keep driving ahead with their portfolios in a complimentary fashion.

Outside of the big five, there are certainly aspirations to grow terminal portfolios, but they may be more a“ nice to have” than an integral part of any business plan.

For the industry, carrier acquisition of terminals is a mixed blessing.

Having strong carriers investing in infrastructure to maximize efficiency is a good thing, and carriers have been able revitalize or kick start new gateways by being creative in ship systems and committing volumes. For a terminal in need of throughput, it’ s the quickest way to guarantee substantive volume, and in some cases economic viability.

On the flip side, a smaller port can easily become carrier-dependent, and if port assets are not maximized, there is a question of land use and efficiency. A reduction in neutral choices, particularly in core ports, is particularly concerning for non-terminal owning carriers.

There are parallels in other areas of big carrier expansion: The reduction in ships held by non-operating carriers and the negative impacts on fluidity and price in sectors of the charter market are a warning of what happens when there is less independent capacity. It’ s those outside the big league who will face the most cost or service degradation.

Having a balance between vertically integrated carriers and a vibrant independent sector is essential for competitiveness, innovation and flexibility for all carriers.

Meanwhile, we can expect the big five to have enough clout to be long-term major players. But further restructuring within that group— depending on the results and priorities of the day— will ultimately determine whether they all forge ahead with increased terminal ownership, or if there is a more selective approach.

email: jeremy @ shippingmastershk. com

History tells us there are phases of accelerated vertical integration when things are good, followed by restructuring and selling of“ non-core” assets.

July 6, 2026 | Page 21

One foot on land