Maritime 2026 Annual Review & Outlook

In Perspective

By Jeremy Masters

As Alphaliner recently reported, Mediterranean Shipping Co.( MSC) has reached the milestone of 7 million TEUs in vessel capacity, and the eight largest carriers— the 1 million-plus-TEU club— now operate upwards of 80 % of global capacity.

The difference in punching power between MSC’ s 7 million TEUs at No. 1 and Yang Ming’ s 725,000 TEUs at No. 9 is already huge, but by the time we get to KMTC at No. 15, their fleet size is just 160,000 TEUs.

Within their ocean capacity expansion, carriers like MSC and CMA CGM have scooped up a tremendous amount of second-hand tonnage from non-operating carriers in the smaller size ships, with the side effect of creating inelasticity of supply and higher prices in the charter market.

MSC subsidiary Terminal Investment Limited( TiL) seeks to become the largest global terminal operator. Maersk, CMA CGM, COSCO, Hapag-Lloyd, Evergreen and Ocean Network Express( ONE) also want to expand their already substantial terminal operating capacity.

The jungle of voracious predators is nothing new, but the predators are bigger and better equipped than ever.

Expansion into logistics has further widened their capabilities, although in this case the big carriers do not have a commanding position.

The fact that an elite set of carriers can now significantly control the global ocean sector, the container handling at many key hubs and increasingly the delivery to outports— and selectively to inland points— makes it tough for the rest of the carriers to compete comprehensively.

Where the smaller lines dwell

Midsize and smaller carriers having to find their way in a jungle of voracious predators is nothing new, but the predators are bigger and better equipped than ever before. So how can they prosper?

Looking beyond Zim Integrated Shipping Services, Wan Hai Lines and Pacific International Lines( PIL)— Nos. 10, 11 and 12, respectively— which are not global operators but still have extensive networks, the rest of the top 30 fall into one or more of the following categories: pure regional carriers focused on one or two key regions, regional carriers focused on one or two key regions but with some deep-sea services that connect to their regional stronghold, or feeder operators that also have selective deep-sea routes.

For Nos. 13 to 30, operated ship sizes are highly concentrated in the 1,000- to 8,000-TEU range, and the largest subcategories are below 3,000 TEUs.

Whereas most of the big carriers have a balanced owned and charter fleet— and thus benefit from some averaging of costs— the midsize carrier fleets can range from almost 100 % owned to 100 % chartered.

These two factors combine to give many of the smaller carriers a sizeable and volatile slot-cost deficiency in the major trades.

Survive and prosper

Midsize carriers with smaller ships can still participate in longer-haul big-ship trades, but they have to be opportunistic, as we have seen with Asia – North America West Coast. When cargo is insufficient and rates are low— as they are right now— there is a high likelihood that they starve, get eaten or both.

Otherwise, it’ s best they focus on trades predominantly populated by sub-8,000-TEU ships, so that their slot economics are competitive.

Some of the more successful midsize carriers in long-haul trades have built out from a regional stronghold providing cargo flows that can be more sticky and less subject to acute rate volatility. If they also operate from regions like the Mediterranean or Southeast Asia, with significant connecting cargo possibilities, that enhances the pool of cargo and allows for some selectivity.

Within any trade there are choices of port call, so it’ s good to find some less-populated submarkets. There are six services linking Antwerp with New York, for example, but only one service linking Ringaskiddy, Ireland, with Wilmington, North Carolina.

A particularly viable focus for midsize carriers is high-growth regional trades like intra-Asia, where operators with a competitive ship system cost, a lean organization and some niche products can happily survive, especially given that the biggest carriers often focus on the wayport legs in these trades.

Whatever the size of the trade, the midsize and smaller carriers are well placed to design key clientfocused services that are differentiated from a product or customer-service point of view.

It’ s no longer a world in which the second- and third-rung lines can aspire to grow into the big leagues, unless they have very deep pockets. There is, however, plenty of scope to avoid being trampled by the behemoths, differentiate and quietly grow by trading on strengths. Being nimble, lean and highly client-focused are key attributes for this segment.

email: jeremy @ shippingmastershk. com

34 Journal of Commerce | January 5, 2026 www. joc. com